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ABSTRACT
The recent works such as InvisiSpec, SafeSpec, and Cleanup-
Spec, among others, provided promising solutions to defend
speculation induced (transient) attacks. However, they intro-
duce delay either when a speculative load becomes safe in the
redo approach or when it is squashed in the undo approach.
We argue that it is due to the lack of fundamental mechanisms
for reversing the effects of speculation in a cache coherence
protocol. Based on mostly unmodified coherence protocol,
the redo approach avoids leaving trace at the expense of dou-
ble loads; the undo approach “stops the world” in recovery to
avoid interference.
This paper provides the first solution to the fundamen-
tal problem. Specifically, we propose ReversiSpec, a com-
prehensive solution to mitigate speculative induced attacks.
ReversiSpec is a reversible approach that uses speculative
buffers in all cache levels to record the effects of speculative
execution. When a speculative load becomes safe, a merge
operation adds the effects of speculative execution to the
global state. When a speculative load is squashed, a purge op-
eration clears the buffered speculative execution states from
speculative buffer. The key problem solved by the paper is
the first demonstration of a reversible cache coherence proto-
col that naturally rollbacks the effects of squashed specula-
tive execution. We design two concrete coherence protocols,
ReversiCC-Lazy and ReversiCC-Eager providing the same
functionality with different trade-offs. Our solution closes a
crucial gap in modern architecture: just like the mechanisms
to roll back the speculation effects inside a processor, Rever-
siSpec provides the mechanisms to roll back the state of the
whole coherence protocol. The key advantage of ReversiSpec
is that, unlike redo or undo, it does not add delay in the crit-
ical path in both commit and squash—the merge and purge
operations are performed in the cache system concurrently
with processor execution. More fundamentally, it provides a
clean interface—purge and merge—that decouples the mech-
anisms of processor and cache coherence. Based on these
interfaces, coherence protocol can be treated again as a black
box, similar to the current systems. We argue that the birth
of the recent speculation induced attacks are largely due to
the lack of our proposed mechanisms.
1. INTRODUCTION
As Spectre [15], Meltdown [18] and other derived at-
tacks [4, 26] demonstrated recently, modern processor archi-
tectures based on speculation are facing huge security issues.
These attacks exploit the speculative execution to modify or
leave trace in the memory system, and extract secretes using
side-channels. The root cause of the speculation induced
Figure 1: Spectre Variant 1
attacks is the incomplete elimination of speculative execution
effects. Specifically, when a processor squashes a sequence
of instructions, the execution effects on architectural states
are completely rolled back thanks to reorder buffer (ROB)
and in-order commit. However, the effects on cache hierar-
chy are not thoroughly eliminated, opening the possibility
of timing side channels attacks [9, 19]. Therefore, security
risks of speculative execution become a huge vulnerability
for modern high performance processors.
Figure 1 shows an example of the speculation induced
attack—Spectre Variant 1 [15]. During speculation, before
the branch is resolved, the execution can bypass a bound-
ary check and access secret data speculatively. After the
branch is resolved, the access to secret is not recorded in
any architectural state, but has left trace depending on the
secret information in the private cache. Thus, the secret can
be easily transmitted over a cache-based timing covert chan-
nel. Since the address could take arbitrary value, the entire
memory could be exposed to the attacker.
Mitigating the effects of commonly used speculative ex-
ecution is challenging. The naive solution that disables all
speculative execution causes huge performance degradation.
Among many mitigation strategies are [12, 25, 26, 28, 32], we
consider InvisiSpec [33] (and the similar SafeSpec [14]) and
CleanupSpec [24] as two representative approaches that are
closely related to this paper.
InvisiSpec [33] keeps the effects of speculative load invis-
ible by bypassing all cache hierarchy and directly placing
the accessed data in the speculative buffer besides L1 cache.
When a speculative load becomes safe, i.e., guaranteed to be
retired from processor, the load is issued to cache hierarchy
again as a normal load. Essentially it is a “redo” approach that
issues all speculative loads twice. Considering the advanced
prediction mechanisms in modern processors, it incurs over-
head for the common case. However, the results of InvisiSpec
is promising, the updated results [34] show that the perfor-
mance overhead of defending the strong “futuristic attacks”
is under 20%. The good performance is achieved by perform-
ing “exposure” for most of the speculative loads, instead of
the more costly “validation”, which is in the critical path of
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execution. The likely concurrent work SafeSpec [14] takes a
similar approach but did not handle the multiprocessor issues
as comprehensive as InvisiSpec.
While InvisiSpec is a clever solution, it is not likely the
optimal one since it introduces the overhead for the common
case. Based on this insight, CleanupSpec [24] attempts to
protect the cache system in an “undo” manner. Instead of
storing the speculative data in the additional structure, it al-
lows all memory operations to update the cache hierarchy,
but records the necessary modifications that have been per-
formed. If a speculative load is squashed in the processor, the
cache system can roll back and recover the state based on the
record. This type of undo approach inherently incurs very
low overhead on the correct-path—the majority cases—and
seems to be more reasonable. Instead, the overhead is only in-
curred for the mis-speculated instructions. We identify three
problems with CleanupSpec. First, the cleanup operations on
the wrong-path will cause inevitable stalls and they are in the
critical path. Second, in order to avoid information leakage
through cache eviction, the design relies on encryption tech-
nique like CEASER [21]. Most importantly, the mitigation
requires random replacement policy [35]. It is well-known
that such policy is not optimal, especially increasing misses
for LRU-friendly workloads [23]. In Figure 2, we show the
performance gap between random replacement policy in L1
and LRU for SPEC and PARSEC. The miss rates of random
replacement can be up to 84% higher than those of LRU
which translate to up to 5.7% performance degradation. The
results are consistent with the findings in [2]. Thus, while
CleanupSpec avoids the overhead for common case for invis-
ible speculation, it in a sense adds the “overhead” for a more
important common case—the baseline performance. Never-
theless, we consider CleanupSpec an important attempt with
a more reasonable undo approach. It trades off generality for
a simpler but more restrictive solution. It is encouraging to
see that the overhead of CleanupSpec is indeed very low.
Researchers also proposed other mitigating solutions such
as conditional speculation [17], speculative taint tracking
(STT) [37] and SpecCFI [16]. In particular, STT provides the
precise conditions to block transient side channels, showing
very low overhead. To avoid information leakage, STT can
either choose to stall necessary instructions, or use InvisiSpec
or CleanupSpec, to ensure their effects can be rolled back.
Therefore, STT and the solutions for invisible speculative
execution are orthogonal. The solution proposed in this paper
can be also used with STT. In the evaluation, we also report
the execution overhead reduction based on STT.
Based on the analysis, we see that speculative execution
and cache coherence are closely related. In current solutions,
the processor is involved in “patching coherence states” by
re-issuing the safe loads and checking correctness (redo), or
by stalling during state recovery (undo). According to the
simulation results [24, 34, 37], the performance overhead can
be reduced considerably and thus may not be a major con-
cern 1. We believe the more fundamental issue is the lack of
clean abstraction and interface between the processor and
cache coherence for speculative execution. It is essentially
because speculative loads do not participate in the coherence
1This may need to be further validated using the real implementa-
tions in an industry setting.
protocol in the current solutions 2. For non-speculative ex-
ecution, such an abstraction already exists: processors use
the same interface—load and store—to access all memory
addresses, no matter whether they are shared or not. It is
the responsibility of cache coherence mechanisms to serial-
ize conflicting accesses. The same coherence protocol can
provide shared memory abstraction for different processors.
Following the similar principle, it is natural to extend the
existing interface with the support for speculative execution.
Intuitively, the interface should include three operations of
the processor: (1) speculative load; (2) merge, which is per-
formed when a speculative load becomes safe; and (3) purge,
which is performed with a speculative load is squashed. These
operations can conceptually be unified with the ordinary load
and store: both (speculative) load/store and merge/purge
affect the state of a given cache line. During speculative exe-
cution, the processor can issue speculative loads, letting them
participate in coherence protocol; when a speculative load
becomes safe or squashed, the processor can simply issue the
merge or purge without stall. To realize the correct execu-
tion, we need to achieve a very aggressive goal: the ordinary
load/store, speculative load, merge and purge should execute
concurrently under a unified coherence protocol.
To solve the challenging problem, we propose ReversiSpec,
the first reversible approach that uses speculative buffers in
all cache levels to record the effects of speculative execution.
On merge, the effects of speculative execution are added to
the global state from speculative buffer; on purge, they are
cleared from these buffers. Unlike redo and undo approach,
the key challenge is how to correctly maintain and recover
the cache line states when the line is accessed concurrently
by multiple speculative and non-speculative loads. Our key
contributions are two reversible cache coherence protocols,
ReversiCC-Lazy and ReversiCC-Eager, that can elegantly
merge or rollback the effects of speculative execution in the
whole cache system. They provide the same functionality
with different design trade-offs. Though ReversiCC-Lazy
incurs less overhead overall, ReversiCC-Eager may behave
better for certain applications when memory accesses from
different cores are more interleaved. We believe our solution
closes a key gap in modern architecture: just like the mecha-
nisms to roll back the speculation effects inside a processor,
ReversiSpec provides the mechanisms to roll back the state
of the whole coherence protocol. We argue that the birth of
the recent speculation induced attacks are largely due to the
lack of our proposed mechanisms.
We acknowledge the increased protocol complexity and
coherence overhead. We try the best to present the design
principles and all details of ReversiSpec protocols but leave
verification of the protocol as future work since it is far be-
yond the scope and capacity of an architecture paper. Even
with the current relatively high traffic overhead, the slow-
down on execution time is lower than other solutions. We
argue that the complexity and overhead are worthwhile given
the clean abstraction and the benefits of separation of con-
cerns. Note that ReversiSpec subsumes the point solutions
that allow speculative loads to execute in a limited manner.
2In CleanupSpec, speculative loads can change coherence states,
but special hardware structures and policies are needed to ensure
correct recovery.
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For example, [25] proposes to delay speculative load exe-
cution on L1 cache miss (DOM) but allow it on cache hit.
Essentially, there exists a trade-off between performance and
complexity. ReversiSpec is a solution in one extreme that
supports the most general scenarios with all necessary com-
plexities. Nevertheless, given that ReversiSpec is the first
solution for the very difficult problem, we do not claim our
solution to be optimal and expect that it can be improved in
many ways. But it is a significant advance of the state-of-the-
art because it demonstrates for the first time that the natural
and fundamental approach is indeed possible.
To evaluate ReversiCC-Lazy and ReversiCC-Eager, we
implement the two complete protocols together with other ar-
chitectural supports in Gem5 [6]. We evaluate our design and
compare with InvisiSpec on 21 SPEC and 9 PARSEC bench-
marks. We show that ReversiSpec incurs an average slow-
down of 8.3% on SPEC, and 48% (ReversiCC-Lazy)/51%
(ReversiCC-Eager) on PARSEC. When used with STT, the ex-
ecution is reduced from on average 17.8% to 7.2% for SPEC,
and 29.3% to 19%/20.7%(ReversiCC-Lazy and ReversiCC-
Eager respectively) for PARSEC. 3 While not yet formally
verified the protocols, we intensively tested and validated the
protocol properties by instrumenting the protocol specifica-
tion files in Gem5. Both protocols can complete all bench-
marks and test programs. This gives the high confidence of
the correctness of the protocols.
2. BACKGROUND
2.1 Out-of-Order Execution
Modern processors exploit the speculative out-of-order
property to execute instructions in parallel at the backend.
Instructions are fetched in the processor frontend, dispatched
to reservation stations for scheduling, issued to functional
units in the processor backend, and finally retired (at which
point they update architectural state). Instructions proceed
through the frontend, backend and retirement stages in order,
possibly out of order, and in order, respectively. In-order
retirement is implemented by queuing instructions in a re-
order buffer (ROB) in instruction fetch order and retiring a
completed instruction when it reaches the head of ROB. Spec-
ulatively executing instructions out-of-order is an important
technique to avoid stalls due to control and data dependencies
and achieve high performance.
2.2 Threat model
Transient Speculative Attack We use the terminology de-
fined in [37]. The transient instruction is a mis-speculated
access instruction that will be eventually squashed. The ex-
ecution result does not affect architectural state and is dis-
carded as if their executions have never happened. On the
other hand, the non-transient instruction is an access instruc-
tion that is eventually retired and changes architectural state.
We assume the same thread mode as InvisiSpec. We only
focus on defending transient attacks—the futuristic attack
mode described in [34]. Non-transient attacks and traditional
covert channel attacks are out of scope. We assume that at-
tacker could exploit transient instructions to arbitrarily access
3We obtained the results of InvisiSpec and STT by running their
unmodified open source implementations. The overhead numbers
are only slightly different from reported in the paper.
ast
ar gcc bzi
p2
pe
rlb
en
ch
gro
ma
cswr
f
hm
me
r
mc
f
gcc mi
lc
libq
ua
ntu
m
om
ne
tpp
bw
av
es
ga
me
ss
zeu
sm
p
les
lie3
d
cal
cul
ix
Ge
ms
FD
TD
0.90
0.95
1.00
No
rm
al
ize
d 
Ex
ec
 T
im
e
Random LRU
Figure 2: Random vs. LRU
secrets from the memory, or computed using transient data.
We assume that the secret is transmitted to the correct path us-
ing cache hierarchy-based side channels. We consider attacks
that exploits the entire cache hierarchy, including private (e.g.
L1-D and L-I cache) and shared caches (L2/LLC). The TLB
and branch predictors can be protected by other orthogonal
techniques [25, 33]. The adversary may transiently access
the cache and modify its state through data installs, evic-
tions, updates to replacement and coherence states and obtain
information through timing difference on cache accesses.
In particular, we focus on protecting the SameThread and
Cross-Core models and leave SMT alongside. The SMT re-
lated threat could be prevented by recent techniques such as
adding defense when context switch happens [1] or making
the cache way-partitioned to avoid SMT-side channels [24].
Based on this assumption, the attacker cannot execute concur-
rently with the victim on another SMT context. We also do
not protect microarchitectural channel that monitors the tim-
ing of execution units [15] including floating-point units [3]
and SIMD units [26], which can be mitigated by not schedul-
ing the victim and adversary in adjacent SMT contexts [33].
We also do not protect channels based on contention on the
network-on-chip [31] and DRAM [30], which may allow an
adversary to learn coarse-grain information about the victim.
2.3 Existing Defence Mechanisms
InvisiSpec [33] is the first hardware mitigation solution us-
ing a redo approach to make speculation invisible. It proposes
to use separate speculative buffers to prevent speculatively
transient instructions from making cache changes. For every
data load, InvisiSpec first performs a load and fetches the
data directly into its speculative buffer, without making any
changes to all cache components. When a load becomes safe,
it issues a second load which will change cache state and
leave trace in the memory. Given that most loads are correctly
speculated, InvisiSpec incurs the cost of “double” accesses to
the cache hierarchy for most loads. To correctly implement
the memory consistency model, a redo access needs to be
performed before retirement of the load, making it a part of
critical path. The overhead is reduced by the novel exposure
mechanism that can potentially replace most of the costly
validation.
CleanupSpec [24] is another mitigation solution for tran-
sient attacks. This is proposed as the first undo-based ap-
proach to mitigate the transient attacks with lower overhead.
The CleanupSpec is designed to modify and record all the
speculative transient modification to the cache system. When
a mis-speculation is detected, not only squashing the illegal
instructions in the processor perspective, the entire cache
system will perform cleanup operations to either invalidate or
roll back to the state before the mis-speculation. In this way,
although the transient instruction can leave trace, Cleanup-
Spec uses roll-back method and cache architecture supports
3
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to remove all of them. Different from InvisiSpec, such an
undo approach ensures that most common correctly spec-
ulated loads are only performed once. Although Cleanup-
Spec incurs relatively lower overhead, the solution is not
as general as InvisiSpec. Specifically, it requires random
L1 cache replacement and randomized cache design such as
CEASER [21, 22]. Figure 2 shows that on SPEC2006 the
performance of random replacement is not optimal, the per-
formance degradation can be as large as 5.7% compared to
LRU, it is especially true for LRU-friendly workloads [23].
Different from the redo and undo approach, invisible specu-
lation can also be achieved by restricting the speculation. For
example, [25] delays the execution of speculative load on L1
miss (DOM) and avoids processor stall by value prediction.
Thus, a speculative load does not change the coherence states
when missing in the L1 cache. This solution is obviously
simpler than ReversiSpec but may incur higher overhead due
to the stall. Figure 3 partially shows the overhead when DOM
is used without value prediction, which is indeed higher than
30%. While value prediction can further reduce the overhead,
as discussed before, this solution does not provide a clean
interface between processor and cache coherence. Essentially,
there exists a trade-off between performance and complexity.
ReversiSpec is a solution in one extreme that supports the
most general scenarios with all necessary complexities.
Speculative Taint Tracking (STT) [37] is a more compre-
hensive defense strategy. It considers more general situation
such as implicit channels that are not clearly understood be-
fore. The main idea of STT is to only protect the transmit
access instructions. The transient access could modify the
cache block as long as the result will not be computed for
transmitting the secret. STT techniques simply delay the exe-
cution of the tainted instruction until all the taint instructions
it depends on have correctly resolved. By doing this, STT
reduces large amount of load that need protection. By untaint-
ing the delayed instruction on the fly, the processor is safely
protected and incurs a relatively low overhead comparing to
simply adding fences before each instruction. The STT tech-
nique could also be combined with other mitigation such as
Invisispec or cleanupSpec, and also the solution presented in
this paper. In fact, STT can increase the benefits of ReversiS-
pec because less instructions are marked as unsafe—avoiding
more unnecessary merge and purge operations. Figure 14
in the evaluation shows that ReversiSpec can indeed further
reduce the overhead of STT based on instruction stall.
Other less related mitigation mechanisms include condi-
tional speculation [25] which defines the security dependency
and stalls the speculative execution when the runtime exe-
cution pattern matches the dependency. It is less general
in a sense that the pattern is constructed manually and it is
always hard to cover all the cases. The most recent work
SpecCFI [16] performs static analysis on the control flow
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graph and uses that to prevent the malicious indirect branch.
3. REVERSISPEC DESIGN
3.1 Invisible Speculation Security Property
Property 1: Roll back mis-speculation. If an instruction
is mis-speculated, any state changes including the coherence
states should be rolled back after speculation window. Since
the existing processor mechanisms already correctly ensure
architectural state rollback, we focus on cache states.
Property 2: Non-observable speculation in the same
core. The non-speculative loads in the same core cannot
observe its own younger speculative loads 4.
Property 3: Non-observable speculation in different
core. An attacker concurrently running on another core
should not observe any state changes caused by the victim’s
speculative load, even within the speculation window.
3.2 Processor Model and Interface
Different from existing solutions, we define three opera-
tions in ReversiSpec as the interface between processor and
cache system: (1) speculative load; (2) merge, which is per-
formed when a speculative load becomes safe; and (3) purge,
which is performed with a speculative load is squashed. The
processor performs a merge or purge operation by issuing a
PrMerge or PrPurge request to the cache system. For each
speculative load, depending on whether it eventually becomes
safe or is squashed, will lead to a merge or purge. Similar
to InvisiSpec [33, 37], the processor tracks Visibility Point
(VP) dynamically during execution, which depends on the
attack model. In the Spectre-model, an instruction reaches
VP if all older control-flow instructions have resolved. In the
Futuristic-model, an instruction reaches VP if it cannot be
squashed for any reason. All the instructions before (after)
VP are considered to be unsafe (safe). With VP maintained
during execution, the process can determine whether each
instruction becomes safe in each cycle. When an instruction
is initially fetched, it is marked as “unsafe”. When the load
is issued, if it is safe, then a normal read request is generated;
otherwise, a speculative request is issued.
4It is impossible that a non-speculative load has an older speculative
load, if so the non-speculative load should have been speculative.
4
ŏ
core(i)
LQ ŏ
ŏŏ
LQ>LM@
SBL1[i,j]
L1
ŏŏ
SBL2[i,j]
L2
SBL1[i,*]
SBL2[i,*]
ŏŏ
SBL2[j,*]
&%
)>
L@
&%
)>
M@
ŏ
ŏ
valid readymetadata addr SpecData Coh_State
L1/L2 SpecBuffer Entry
Figure 5: SpecBuffer
Typically, the update of VP in a cycle will trigger the merge
or purge of sequence of instructions. Therefore, the merge
and purge request can be sent to the cache system in batch.
To purge a sequence of instructions, only the oldest one is
sent and all younger ones are squashed together. For merge,
only the youngest is sent and all older ones will be merged.
Figure 4 shows the processor model and the an example of
the batched merge and purge. Thus, while each speculative
load logically incurs a processor is not significant.
3.3 Speculative Buffer Structure
ReversiSpec uses speculative buffer (specBuffer) to keep
the effects of speculation. Similar to InvisiSpec [33], there
is a one-to-one mapping relation between a processor’s load
queue (LQ) entry and a specBuffer entry in both L1 and
L2. Figure 5 shows the specBuffer organization. For a
given LQ entry in core(i)—LQ[i, j]—there is a correspond-
ing specBuffer entry in L1 cache, SBL1[i, j], and L2 cache,
SBL2[i, j]. We denote the specBuffer of a core(i) in L1 and
L2 as SBL1[i,∗] and SBL2[i,∗], respectively. In this paper, we
assume private L1 cache and shared L2 cache as the LLC,
so in hardware, SBL1[i,∗] is associated with each core’s L1
cache and all cores’ SBL2[i,∗] are organized together asso-
ciating with the shared L2. The format of each specBuffer
in L1 and L2 is the same. The valid bit indicates whether
the entry is in use—only the LQ entries for speculative loads
have valid specBuffer entries. The ready bit indicates whether
the coherence transactions related to the entry is in transient.
The metadata field keeps speculative access information, e.g.,
the number of accesses performed to the cache line while it
is speculative. This information is used to update the cache
status if the line is merged later. While we indicate SpecData
field, it is only used to store the actual data of the cache
line if it is not allocated in cache. Thus, there is not much
data movement between specBuffer and cache during merge.
Similarly, Coh_State records the coherence state of the line,
and is only used when it does not exist in cache. Otherwise,
the normal state field in each cache line is used to keep the
state. The combined size of all SBL1[i,∗] and SBL2[i,∗] is
2× (# o f cores)× (# o f LQ entries).
The only additional hardware structure associated with
each SBL2[i,∗] is a counting bloom filter (CBFi) [10], which
approximately records the address set of all cache lines that
currently present in each SBL2[i,∗]. The hardware structure,
also known as signature, is used in several prior architec-
tures for address disambiguiation [7, 8, 20, 29, 36]. The key
property of CBF is that addresses can be both inserted and
removed, thus maintaining a dynamic changing set. As nor-
mal bloom filters, the membership check can be done very
fast, it can generate false positives but never false negatives.
The usage of CBFs in L2’s specBuffers is that, after each
speculative load from core(i) is recorded in the corresponding
SBL2[i,∗], ReversiSpec coherence protocol (will be discussed
in Section 4) requires to get a counter, spec core, which in-
dicates the current total number of speculative loads to this
line. Since all speculative loads are recorded in specBuffer
of L2, this can be obtained by checking all SBL2[ j,∗], where
j 6= i. However, such operations are expensive. The CBFs
associated with each SBL2[ j,∗] can be used as the filter to
avoid most of the search: we can first perform membership
check of the line address with all CBFj ( j 6= i), search is only
performed on those which have positive outcome.
3.4 Speculative Buffer Operations
We focus on L1 specBuffer operations as L2 is only slightly
different. At L1, we define operations in a complete space de-
termined by: (1) access type: speculative or non-speculative;
(2) specBuffer hit or miss; and (3) cache hit or miss. Concep-
tually we have eight combinations. For a non-speculative
load, it should only access and bring data to L1 if missed.
If the line also presents in specBuffer, it must have been
created by some speculative load in program order after the
non-speculative load. It triggers certain ReversiSpec coher-
ence protocol transitions. The protocol ensures that the state
reached is the same as if the non-speculative load is per-
formed first. If the line misses in specBuffer, we just follow
the normal coherence protocol for cache miss or hit.
For a speculative load, it should be recorded in specBuffer
and not bring data into the cache. If missed in both cache and
specBuffer, the line is brought to the specBuffer, no cache
block is allocated, and the state according to ReversiSpec
protocol is recorded in specBuffer. If it hits in cache but
misses in specBuffer, the cache line is brought from cache
to specBuffer, the state is changed according to the protocol,
and the cache line and specBuffer entry has the same state
(recorded in L1). If it misses in cache but hits in specBuffer,
there is no state change and the speculative load gets data
from specBuffer. It is the case where a speculative load
is served by previously speculative accessed data, which is
correct. The situation is the same when hitting in both cache
and specBuffer—speculative data is returned.
For L2, the only additional operation is that, for speculative
load, after similar operations as L1 are performed, we need to
get the updated spec core and returns to the protocol. Based
on that, different state transitions are performed.
4. REVERSISPEC COHERENCE PROTOCOL
We assume that each processor has a private L1 cache and
they share the L2 cache which is associated with the directory.
The two protocols are designed based on a standard MESI
coherence protocol. The other protocols (e.g. MOESI) can
be extended with similar principles. The essential ideas are
concretely realized in the state transition diagrams.
4.1 Insights and Challenges
The key problem is the interference between the specula-
tive execution and normal coherence states. While the states
in specBuffer can be conceptually merged or purged, it only
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solves half of the problem: they do not provide the solution to
manage the coherence states. As discussed before, specBuffer
is also used in InvisiSpec [33], which intentionally avoids
the modifications to coherence protocol. This paper needs to
solve a new difficult open problem.
We approach this problem by carefully analyzing all pos-
sible interactions between speculative and non-speculative
executions and encode the various scenarios in new specula-
tive states. Two protocols are proposed to ensure the correct
state transitions among all speculative and normal states. The
two protocols, ReversiCC-Lazy and ReversiCC-Eager, are
different in whether the current exclusive states are effected
by the speculative loads. In ReversiCC-Lazy, we try to make
the state change “lazy” and defer the eventual transitions at
merge. In ReversiCC-Eager, we “eagerly” trigger the state
transitions from exclusive to new speculative states by specu-
lative loads. The reason of presenting two designs is two-fold.
First, we show that both protocols could achieve the same
functionality and present a wide design space so that follow-
up works can get insights from our results. Second, the
coherence overhead of the two designs are not the same, in
particular, ReversiCC-Eager may introduce more coherence
traffic but may work better for applications when memory
accesses from different caches are more interleaved. The
comprehensive specification of both protocol could lay the
ground of future optimizations to reduce coherence overhead.
We have put significant efforts in both mentally ensuring
the correctness and aggressively asserting and checking our
implementations in Gem5 [6]. At this point, based on the
described protocols, all benchmarks can finish the complete
executions. We gain significant confidence of the protocols
with our intensive testing and intend to open source the im-
plementation, similar to InvisiSpec and STT.
4.2 Coherence Messages
Messages From Description
Rd Proc Read request from processor
Wr Proc Write request from processor
SpecRd Proc Speculative read from processor
PrMerge Proc Merge from processor
PrPurge Proc Purge from processor
GetS L1,L2 Notify L2/other L1 sharers a processor
requests a shared copy
GetX L1,L2 Notify L2/other L1 sharers a processor
requests a copy to modify, need to invali-
date other speculative and shared copies
GetSpec L1,L2 Notify L2/other L1 sharers a processor
requests a speculative copy
Upgr L1,L2 Notify L2/other L1 sharers a processor
is changed from E to M state, need to
invalidate other speculative and shared
copies
L1Merge L1,L2 Notify L2/other L1 sharers a processor
has merged its speculative data into L1
cache
L1Purge L1,L2 Notify L2/other L1 sharers a processor
has purged its speculative data into L1
cache
Table 1: Coherence Messages in ReversiSpec
Table 1 shows the coherence messages used in ReversiSpec
coherence protocols. From the processor, besides the normal
read and write request, we add SpecRd, PrMerge, and PrPurge
when the processor issues a speculative read, merge and purge
request, respectively. For the messages between L1 and L2,
besides the normal GetS, GetX, and Upgr (Upgrade) message,
we add GetSpec, L1Merge, and L1Purge to represent a the
speculative load request, its merge and purge.
In ReversiSpec, L1Merge and L1Purge are used to propa-
gate the merge and purge operation to all the relevant caches.
The policy for sending these messages are not the same in
ReversiCC-Lazy and ReversiCC-Eager.
4.3 Coherence Actions
Actions Level Description
Flush L1 Flush dirty data back to L2
Fwd L1 Forward data to other L1 re-
quester
FwdData L2 Forward data from L2 cache to
L1 requester
FwdSpecData L2 Forward speculative data from
L2 specBuffer to other L1
GetFromMem L2 Fetch cache line from memory
and create cache entry at L2
GetSpecFromMem L2 Fetch cache line from mem-
ory but create entry in L2
SpecBuffer
FwdGetX L2 Forward GetX message to other
sharer (including speculative
sharers) to invalidate these
copies
FwdUpgr L2 Forward Upgrade message to
other sharer (including specula-
tive sharers) to invalidate their
copies
FwdGetS L2 Forward GetS message to Modi-
fied sharers to trigger coherence
state downgrades
FwdGetSpec L2 Forward GetSpec message to
other normal and speculative
sharers to update their coher-
ence states
FwdL1Merge L2 Local merge and forward
L1Merge to normal and spec-
ulative sharers to update their
states
FwdL1Purge L2 Local purge and forward
L1Purge to normal and spec-
ulative sharers update their
states
Table 2: Coherence Actions in ReversiSpec
Table 2 shows the actions in ReversiSpec protocols. The
table does not include the local merge and purge when L1
receives PrMerge and PrPurge, since they are not shown in
the cache state transition graphs. We also do not include the
action to create SpecBuffer entries on speculative load. These
actions are always performed.
4.4 Coherence States
ReversiCC-Lazy and ReversiCC-Eager have two kinds of
coherence states. One is called normal states, which are the
same transition states required in the original MESI protocol.
The normal states reveal the status of the cache line in the
cache system, depending on whether it is exclusive, modified
or shared among multiple L1 caches. If a cache line is in a
normal state, it should be invalid in the specBuffer and all
the read request related with this cache line should be non-
speculative loads or completely merged speculative loads.
The second kind is the unique speculative states that captures
the status of cache lines that are being speculatively accessed.
The line may exist only in specBuffer when it does not exist in
cache. In this scenario, the state will be kept in the specBuffer
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entry, otherwise, it will be kept as the part of the original
cache line. The speculative states can be reached from normal
states on receiving a speculative load request. The cache line
will remain in speculative state during speculation. When
all the speculative accesses of this cache line are merged or
purged, its state transitions back to normal state. Table 3 and
Table 4 show all the speculative states in ReversiCC-Lazy
and ReversiCC-Eager, respectively. For each state, we also
provide the global property that it implies.
Level New States Global Status
L1
ISpec No local non-spec copy, one lo-
cal spec copy
ESpec One non-spec copy (E), one or
more spec copies
SSpec Multiple non-spec copies, one
or more spec copies
MSpec One non-spec copy (M), one or
more spec copies
L2
ISpec No non-spec copy, one or more
spec copies
ESpec One non-spec copy (E), one or
more spec copies
SSpec Multiple non-spec copies, one
or more spec copies
MSpec One non-spec copy (M), one or
more spec copies
Table 3: Speculative States of ReversiCC-Lazy
Level New States Global Status
L1
ES One non-spec copy (E), one or
more spec copies but no local
spec copy
SpecE At most one non-spec copy, only
one spec copy
SpecS Multiple non-spec copies, one
or more spec copies
ESpecS At most one non-spec copy (E),
one or more spec copies
SpecM One non-spec copy (M), one or
more spec copies
L2
ISpecE no non-spec copy, only one spec
copy
ISpecES no non-spec copy, multiple spec
copies
ESpecS one non-spec copy (E), one or
more spec copies
SSpecS Multiple non-spec copies, one
or more spec copies
Table 4: Speculative States of ReversiCC-Eager
4.5 ReversiCC-Lazy Coherence Transitions
L1 State Transitions The L1 state transition diagram of
ReversiCC-Lazy is shown in Figure 6. The key design princi-
ple is that the normal states are not changed until the merge
of speculative loads, i.e., becomes non-speculative. When
a speculative load misses in L1, the state is changed to IS-
pec and a GetSpec is sent to L2. The returned cache line
is inserted into specBuffer but not L1 cache. If the proces-
sor issues another speculative read to this line, it will hit in
specBuffer and stay in ISpec. When the speculative load
is later merged, the processor sends L1Merge to L2, which
will piggyback in the response indicating whether the next
L1 state should be S (if there is at least one non-speculative
sharer, “S”) or otherwise E (“non-S”). If the processor issues
a normal read, it will bypass the SpecBuffer and get data from
L1 or L2. The current state will change to ESpec or SSpec
depending on whether it is the only non-speculative sharer—
similar to the previous case. If L1 receives a GetX/Upgrade
Figure 6: ReversiCC-Lazy L1 State Transition
Figure 7: ReversiCC-Lazy L2 State Transition
or a processor issues a PrPurge, the line will be invalidated
(transition to I) and the entry in specBuffer will be removed
with local purge. For PrPurge, an L1Purge will be sent to L2
and trigger the purge there.
When a speculative load hits a cache line in E, the state
transitions to ESpec. If speculatively accessed on ESpec by
the local processor again, the line will stay in the same state.
Transitioned from E, the line is still the only non-speculative
copy, and the cache will receive the forwarded GetSpec and
GetS. When the processor later merges (PrMerge) or purges
(PrPurge), the line will transition back from ESpec to E and
be locally merged or purged. This situation also implies that
there is no non-speculative read to the line, otherwise, the
state will transition to SSpec. However, if a remote specu-
lative read is performed (GetSpec) before the merge/purge,
the line stays in ESpec. This reflects the “lazy” nature of
ReversiCC-Lazy—a speculative load does not change the
non-speculative owner. When a speculative load hits a cache
line in S, the state transitions to SSpec. When a GetS or
L1Merge is received on ESpec, the state will also transition to
SSpec since either case will create the second non-speculative
copy. The behavior when later receiving merge or purge on
SSpec is similar to ESpec. In both cases, L1Merge or L1
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Purge is not sent to L2 because the speculative load hits in L1
and L2 is not notified if the load had been non-speculative.
When a speculative load hits a cache line in M, the state
transitions to MSpec. Similar to SSpec and ESpec, PrMerge
or PrPurge only incurs local merge or purge. Similar to
ESpec, when a GetSpec is received since it is owner, data is
forwarded to the requester without changing state. If a GetS
or L1Merged is received (forwarded by L2 due to another
processor’s PrMerge in ISpec), there are at least two copies
of non-speculative copy, so MSpec transitions to SSpec with
data flushed to L2.
Similar to ESpec and MSpec, if a GetSpec is forwarded
to the cache on E or M, the state is not changed and the non-
speculative owner only forwards the requested data. Later,
when the speculative read is merged, the owner will receive a
L1Merge and transitions from E/M to S.
L2 State Transitions The L2 state transition diagram of
ReversiCC-Lazy is shown in Figure 7. In L2, spec core in-
dicates the number of speculative copies, which is increased
when a response is sent to a speculative load and a the cor-
responding specBuffer entry is created in L2. As discussed,
the current spec core can be calculated efficiently with CBFs
in L2. When a speculative load misses in L2, after obtaining
the data from memory, the state transitions to ISpec. The
cache will stay in this state when receiving further GetSpec
requests. When an L1Purge is received from a speculative
reader and spec core is larger than 0 after removing the spec-
ulative reader, the state is not changed since there are still
other speculative copies. If an L1Merge is received on ISpec
and spec core is 0, it means that the only speculative copy
becomes a non-speculative one, the state should transition to
E. If spec core is greater than 0, it means that there is non-
speculative copy and at least one speculative copy. Based on
the definition of ESpec in Table 3, ISpec should transition to
ESpec. Same transition happens on receiving a GetS, in this
case, a non-speculative copy is directly installed.
In ESpec, when L1Purge is received and spec core is 0
after removing the speculative reader, all speculative copies
are removed, and only the single non-speculative copy is left,
thus the state transitions to E. When an L1Merge is received
and there is no speculative copy (spec core is 0), the state
transitions to S. It means that the second non-speculative
copy is created in addition to the line in E. In ReversiCC-
Lazy, whenever an L1Merge is received from L1, it should
be forwarded to the current non-speculative owner to final-
ize the state transition, e.g., M → S. It is performed by
FwdL1Merge operation—L1Merge is forwarded to the cur-
rent non-speculative owner. Recall that due to the “lazy”
nature, no transition happens for the non-speculative owner
when the speculative read occurred. Moreover, if an L1Merge
is received and there still exists at least one speculative copy
(spec core greater than 0), ESpec will transition to SSpec.
In SSpec, when an L1Merge or L1Purge is received and
there is no other speculative copy, the state transitions to S
because SSpec implies that there are multiple non-speculative
copies. The transitions from M is similar to E, on a GetSpec,
it transitions to MSpec, reflecting the global status of one
non-speculative copy (M) and at least one speculative copies.
MSpec will transition back to M on L1Purge if there is no
speculative copy. On a GetS, similar to transition M → S,
MSpec transitions to SSpec. The difference between MSpec
and ESpec is that the latter indicates a clean and exclusive
non-speculative copy—allowing a transition from ISpec on a
GetS or L1Merge. This is not possible for MSpec.
It is important to understand why L2 needs to transition
from M/E to MSpec/ESpec, while the non-speculative owner
state in L1 is not changed after serving the forwarded specu-
lative request. It is used to properly capture the global status
of the co-existence of speculative and non-speculative copies.
If we stay in M/E when speculative copies exist, on GetS,
they will transition to S, which indicates no speculative copy.
SSpec is also required since otherwise E will transition to S
on a speculative load missed in L1 and there is no way back
to E when the load is purged.
4.6 ReversiCC-Eager Coherence Transitions
Figure 8: ReversiCC-Eager L1 State Transition
Figure 9: ReversiCC-Eager L2 State Transition
L1 State Transitions The L1 state transition diagram of
ReversiCC-Eager is shown in Figure 8. On a speculative L1
miss (I), if there is neither non-speculative, either E or M
(non-S), nor speculative copies (spec core is zero), I tran-
sitions to SpecE, otherwise it transitions to SpecS. SpecE
indicates that this is the only single speculative copy. The fur-
ther speculative read from the same processor on SpecE will
not change the state. The state can be also reached when the
processor hits on E. In this case, the non-speculative copy ex-
ists in the local cache, and a SpecBuffer entry is created. Note
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that in this case, L2 is not notified, thus no SpecBuffer entry
is created and spec core is not updated in L2. In summary,
SpecE also implies that there is at most one non-speculative
copy but exactly one speculative copy. If the cache receives
another GetSpec, it will transition to ESpecS, which indicates
multiple speculative copies. At SpecE, if the only speculative
copy is purged, depending on whether the cache has non-
speculative copy, it transitions to E (has non-spec line) or I
(no non-spec line).
At ESpecS, when an L1Purge is forwarded from L2, the
state changes to SpecE. We will shortly explain the purge
forwarding policy of L2, and this is one of the two scenarios
that L1 would receive the L1Purge. In E, when the cache
receives a GetSpec, it forwards the data to the requester and
transitions to ES. In ES, if the local processor issues a local
speculative read, the state will also transition to ESpecS. We
see that ESpecS can be reached with three paths: (1) I →
SpecE → ESpecS with two speculative reads in different
processors. In this case, there can be no non-speculative copy.
(2) E→ SpecE→ ESpecS with speculative hit on E and then
a speculative read from another processor. In this case, there
is one non-speculative copy in E and two speculative copies.
(3) E→ ES→ ESpecS with a remote speculative read from
another processor and a local speculative hit on ES. For (2)
and (3), the two events are reordered but ReversiCC-Eager
can correctly reach the same state. In summary, ESpecS
means that there is at most one non-speculative copy and
multiple speculative copies.
For a line in ES, the L1 cache can receive an L1Merge
or an L1Purge, which will trigger the transitions to S and
E, respectively. At L2, the L1Merge and L1Purge will be
only forwarded when last speculative copy is removed (spec
core=0). In SpecS, PrMerge will trigger the transition to S,
since SpecS indicates that there are already multiple non-
speculative copies. PrPurge also triggers the transition to S
but only when the cache has a valid non-speculative copy.
Similar to E, when a local speculative read hits in cache,
the state will transition to SpecM. In SpecM/SpecE, when a
GetSpec is received, both will transition to ESpecS and flush
the data. On PrMerge/PrPurge, SpecM will always transition
back to M (unlike SpecE, which may transition to I based on
its definition), it is because the fact that the state is still SpecM
means there is no other speculative reads occurred between
the local speculative read and the merge/purge. On receiving
a GetS (non-speculative load), SpecM, SpecE, and ESpecS
will all transition to SpecS, since the single non-speculative
copy in these states (either M or E) will become shared.
In ESpecS, the cache will always forward PrMerge/PrPurge
to L2, it is possible that L2 does not have an SpecBuffer en-
try for the speculative access, e.g., the speculative load hits
locally in ES, transitioning to ESpecS. In this case, L2 cache
will simply discard the message and do not change spec core.
L2 State Transitions The L2 state transition diagram of
ReversiCC-Eager is shown in Figure 9. When a speculative
load misses in L2, it will first transition to ISpecE after get-
ting data from memory. Another speculative load from a
different processor will get the forwarded data from the line
in ISpecE, and both of line will transition to ISpecES. In
ISpecE/ISpecES, there is no non-speculative copy.
On receiving a GetS on state ISpecE, if it is sent from
the speculative owner, it transitions to SpecE, indicating the
speculative and non-speculative copy are coming from the
same core. On the other hand, if the GetS is sent from other
cores, ISpecE transitions to ESpecS, indicating the spec copy
and the non-spec copy are from different cores. If GetS is
sent on state ISpecES, the state transitions to ESpecS, indicat-
ing a single non-speculative copy of data. At SpecE, either
L1Merge or L1Purge will reset the SpecE to E state. A GetS
sent from the core other than the owner will transition the sate
to SSpecS. A GetSpec will transition the state to ESpecS. At
ISpecES, an L1Merge will also transition ISpecES to ESpecS
since a speculative copy becomes a non-speculative one.
It is important to understand the condition for L2 to forward
the L1Purge, specified by FwdL1Purge. In ReversiCC-Eager,
FwdL1Purge occurs in two situations: (1) In ISpecES, when
L2 receives the L1Purge and spec core is 1, L1Purge should
be forwarded to the last speculative copy. This is needed to
transition the L1 line from ESpecS to SpecE. (2) In ESpecS,
when L2 receives the L1Purge and spec core is 0 (there is no
longer any speculative copy), L1Purge should be forwarded
to the current non-speculative owner. This is needed to
transition the L1 line from ES back to E.
SSpecS means there are multiple non-speculative/speculative
copies, and can be reached with S receives a GetSpec, or ES-
pecS receives a GetS/L1Merge. It will transition back to S
only when the last speculative copy is merged or purged. Sim-
ilar to E, when GetSpec is received on M, the state transitions
to ESpecS. When the speculative copy is purged, the state
transitions to E, not M. We believe that it is correct since
ReversiCC-Eager always forward the requests to the current
owner, which can be either E or M. It is possible to recover
exactly to M by introducing a new state, but in the spirit of
explaining the essential ideas, we do not show that to avoid
further complicating the discussion.
5. EXAMPLES AND SECURITY ANALYSIS
5.1 Running Examples
Case 1: Speculative read on Invalid state and then
purge. The execution traces of this case in the two protocols
are shown in Figure 10. In both protocols, the SpecBuffer
entry is created in both L1 and L2 and later removed on purge.
The difference is the state transition sequence. In this case,
the actual data of the cache line is stored in SpecBuffer in
L1 and L2, but when the normal cache already has the cache
line (not in I state), SpecBuffer will not replicate the data and
will just keep the state and other relevant information for the
speculative load.
Figure 10: Speculative Read on Invalid state then purge
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Case 2: Remote SpecRead on Modified state then merge.
As shown in Figure 11, the difference between the two pro-
tocol is on how M is eventually changed to S. In ReversiCC-
Lazy, after forwarding data to the speculative load in P1, the
line in P0 stays in M state. Later M can directly transition to S
when receiving the forwarded L1Merge. In ReversiCC-Eager,
the state transition is divided into two steps: M→ ES→ S.
Figure 11: SpecRead on Modified state then merge
Case 3: Multiple SpecReads on Exclusive state with
one purges then the other merge. This is a more com-
plicated example. As shown in Figure 12, both protocols
can correctly reach the same final global status. This ex-
ample shows that in ReversiCC-Eager there is an additional
L1Merge from L2 to L1. This explains the potential higher
coherence overhead of this protocol.
55
Figure 12: Multiple SpecReads on Exclusive state with one
purges then the other merge
5.2 Security Analysis
At high level, the execution of a speculative read could
be divided by 3 time stamps: 1) before a speculative load is
issued; 2) during speculative execution in memory; 3) after it
merges or purges.
First of all, in Section 3.2, we defined the processor model
to be used along with ReversiSpec. The major property here
is that the speculative load only be marked as safe when it
reaches visibility point. [33,37] has already proved that using
Visibility to taint and untaint instructions is safe and secure.
Since our protocol could be used with STT and other tainting
techniques, we do not need to concern about the security
problem before the instruction is issued. As described in
Section 3.2, loads are all marked as unsafe before fetch. Only
those reaches the visibility point could be updated to safe and
issued as normal reads.
After the speculative load is sent to memory, it will be
speculatively recorded in the SpecBuffer at each cache level
and transition the coherence state to speculative states. In
both ReversiCC-Lazy and ReversiCC-Eager, when forward-
ing messages at L2 level. There are common cases to forward
messages not only to the non-spec sharers, but also specula-
tive sharers. That means there are more messages existing
in memory compared to traditional protocol. But this does
not create any coherence side-channel. Lets assume the at-
tacker wants to issue a write request and detect the latency.
The GetX will be issued to L2 from L1. In normal mem-
ory system, the GetX will be forwarded to all the sharer’s
L1 cache, in order to invalidate their cache line. In both of
our protocol, this GetX will not only be forwarded to non-
speculative sharers, but also speculative sharers. This seems
to have latency difference but actually it does not. Although
invalidations and other protocol messages need to be send
to speculative sharers, but none of them are in the critical
path. The speculative sharer only needs the protocol message
to either update its coherence states or invalidate the entry
in specBuffer. There is no need for the L2 to wait for an
acknowledge sent back from these speculative sharers. Thus
the forwarding of protocol message to speculative sharers
may not introduce a significant access latency.
While merging and purging could be reordered in memory
system, it does not affect the correctness when operating
specBuffers. Let us assume two merge and purge requests
are reordered. The merge request indicates to local merge
all the specBuffer entries older than a, while purge request
indicates to local purge all specBuffer entries younger than b.
Because all the instructions before merge must be safe, thus
we must have that a is younger than b. In this way no matter
which request reaches specBuffer first, all the specBuffer
entries before a will be merged and all the entries after b will
be purged. There will not be any race condition caused by
merging and purging.
Our ReversiSpec protocol can ensure the security of cache
system after we purged and merged the speculative instruc-
tions. After sending the PrPurge or PrMerge request, there
is no other way for attacker to fetch speculative information
from the memory system. All the specBuffer entries related
to a speculative load will be invalidate at each cache level.
The correct status will be correctly reflected in cache com-
ponents. Because at L2 specBuffer, speculative reads from
different processors will create different specBuffer entries.
So at L2 merge or purge operation of a given specBuffer entry
could never affect the status of the other entries even they are
the same cache line. Therefore the memory system under our
new protocol is complete and secure.
Finally, we show that specBuffer cannot be used to create
new channels. Referring to Section 3.3, there is a one-to-one
mapping between a core’s LQ entry, LQ[i, j], to specBuffer
entries in L1 SBL1[i, j] and L2 SBL2[i, j]. While there ex-
ist many specBuffer entries, there is no need to make all
specBuffer entries fully associative. As shown in Figure 5, at
L2, SBL2[i,∗] of different cores are separated, each associated
with a CBFi for efficient address check. There is no need to
organize all SBL2[i,∗] in a set-associative fashion, making it
not vulnerable to cache-based side-channel attacks such as
Prime+Probe. In fact, the specBuffer organization is exactly
the same as InvisiSpec, the only difference is that specBuffers
in L2 are optional in InvisiSpec but required for ReversiSpec.
The specBuffers in InvisiSpec does not create side channel,
they do not create that for ReversiSpec either.
Based on the threat model defined in Section 2.2, the
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specBuffers of ReversiSpec are not vulnerable to new at-
tacks such as SpectreRewind [11]. First, since SMT is out
of scope, we do not consider secret leaked to another thread
simultaneously running on the same core. Second, the attacks
in SpectreRewind relies on microarchitectural channel that
monitors the timing of execution units, making an earlier in-
struction in the same thread be able to transmit secret by the
timing difference due to resource sharing, e.g., non-pipelined
functional units, or floating point unit. However, microarchi-
tectural channel is also not protected by ReversiSpec. Note
that specBuffer will not cause similar problem because it will
not lead to resource contention. Consider two instructions
I1→ I2 in program order, if they are both speculative and I1
brings the line in specBuffer, I2 will hit in specBuffer, but
that will not change the timing of I1. It is indeed possible that
I2 (a speculative load) first brings the line into specBuffer
and I1 (a non-speculative load) misses in cache. In this case,
I1 will not access the data in specBuffer and bring the line
into L1 cache, our protocol ensures that the same state will
be reached as if I1 brings the cache line to L1 first.
6. EVALUATION
6.1 Environment Setup
We evaluate our design using Gem5 [6]. We simulate the
single core system under System-call Emulation (SE) mode
of Gem5, and simulate multi-core system under Full System
(FS) mode of Gem5. We also evaluate the performance of
InvisiSpec (fixed) for comparasion. For InvisiSpec evalua-
tion, we use their public open source code, and evaluate only
for Futuristic. In addition, we also evaluate the benefits of
applying ReversiSpec to STT. The configuration is shown in
Table 5, which is nearly the same as InvisiSpec. The main
difference in our configuration is that we will use ReversiCC-
Lazy and ReversiCC-Eager as the coherence protocol.
We choose SPEC CPU2006 [27] and PARSEC 3.0 [5]
benchmarks, as they respectively represent for single-core
and multi-core evaluation. For SPEC benchmark, we use
21 workloads [13] with the reference data-set. Similar to
the setting in InvisiSpec, we forward the execution by 10
billion instructions and simulate 500 million instructions. For
PARSEC, we run 9 of the multi-threaded workload with the
simmedium input size. We run all these benchmarks with the
setting of 4 cores for the entire region of interest.
Architecture 1 core (SPEC) or 4 cores (PARSEC) at
2.0GHz
Core 8-issue, out-of-order, no SMT, 32 Load
Queue entries, 32 Store Queue entries,
192 ROB, Tournament branch predictor,
4096 BTB entries, 16 RAS entries
Private L1-I Cache 32KB, 64B line, 4-way, 1 cycle round-
trip (RT) lat., 1 port
Private L1-D Cache 64KB, 64B line, 8-way, 1 cycle RT la-
tency, 3 Rd/Wr ports
Shared L2-I Cache Per core: 2MB bank, 64B line, 16-way,
8 cycles RT local latency, 16 cycles RT
remote latency (max)
Network 4x2 mesh, 128b link width, 1 cycle la-
tency per hop
Coherence Protocol ReversiCC-Lazy and ReversiCC-Eager
DRAM RT latency: 50 ns after L2
Table 5: Architecture Configurations
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Figure 13: SPEC2006: InvisiSpec vs. ReversiSpec
6.2 SPEC Analysis
Because SPEC is a single thread benchmark, and ReversiCC-
Lazy and ReversiCC-Eager behave in the same way with the
same results. We combined this two protocol together as
ReversiSpec. Figure13 shows the execution time overhead
of ReversiSpec and InvisiSpec, normalized to the execution
time of the Non-Secure baseline. The design of ReversiS-
pec, taken over all the 21 workloads, on average incurs a
slowdown of 8.3%, while InvisiSpec incurs a slowdown of
23% (slightly higher than reported in [34]. The overheads
of ReversiSpec are mainly caused by merging and purging
operations. Since different program will have different fre-
quency of mis-speculation, ReversiSpec is not always a better
mitigation compared to InvisiSpec. For astar,libquantum,etc.,
it has higher overhead and slowdown. Overall, it is much
better than the result in InvisiSpec.
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Figure 14: SPEC2006: STT+ReversiSpec vs. STT
Figure14 shows the overhead comparison between STT
and STT+ReversiSpec. We see that ReversiSpec can fur-
ther reduce the overhead of STT. Specifically, STT incurs
about 17.8% performance overhead on average (similar to
the 14.5% from [37]), while using STT+ReversiSpec, the
overhead drops to 7.2% on average. We believe incorporating
STT and ReversiSpec is in fact mutual beneficial: since STT
incurs less unsafe instructions, the overhead due to merge and
purge can be naturally reduced. From the results, we believe
that ReversiSpec is indeed an effective approach that can be
used with other orthogonal techniques.
ReversiSpec is comparable with CleanupSpec on single
core results. ReversiSpec reduces the overhead to 8.3% while
CleanupSpec states they only have 5.1% slowdown on top of
on a worse baseline. However, as shown before, CleanupSpec
has more restriction on the replacement policy and need to use
CEASER address encryption for support, while ReversiSpec
mitigate the transient side channel attack more generally.
6.3 PARSEC Analysis
In the multi-core environment, we evaluate both ReversiCC-
Lazy and ReversiCC-Eager. The execution time overhead on
multi-core PARSEC workloads are shown in Figure15. We
see that the performance of both protocols are better than
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InvisiSpec. In ReversiSpec, while additional coherence mes-
sages are transferred across different cores, the execution time
overhead is still reduced. Overall, the InvisiSpec have a 56%
slowdown in on average under TSO, while ReversiCC-Lazy
and ReversiCC-Eager reduced it to 48% and 51% on aver-
age, respectively. Figure 16 shows the overhead comparison
among STT , STT+ReversiCC-Lazy and STT+ReversiCC-
Eager. We see that STT incurs on average 29% performance
overhead, while STT+ReversiCC-Lazy and STT+ReversiCC-
Eager reduced the overhead to 19% and 20.7%, respectively.
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Figure 15: PARSEC: InvisiSpec vs. ReversiSpec
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6.4 Coherence Traffic Overhead
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Figure 17: Traffic Overhead
Figure 17 shows the traffic overhead of ReversiCC-Lazy
and ReversiCC-Eager normalized to the baseline MESI proto-
col. We see that ReversiCC-Eager has relatively more traffic
than ReversiCC-Lazy. This is because ReversiCC-Eager
change the remote sharer’s state eagerly. Thus if the specu-
lative load is squashed, it need to further forward a L1Purge
message to the owner to reverse its state. However, some
benchmark such as freq incurs more traffic under ReversiCC-
Lazy. This could happen because the forwarding of purge
happens in a rare situation and most of them will finally
merge. On average, ReversiCC-Lazy increases the traffic
by an average of 77% while ReversiCC-Eager increases the
traffic by 91%, respectively, over baseline of non-secure pro-
cessor. The key point to notice is that, ReversiSpec allows
the merge and purge to perform concurrently with processor
execution, this is the reason why it still incurs lower execu-
tion overhead despite the considerable traffic overhead. With
coherence decoupled with processor, we believe the traffic
can be further optimized with protocol optimizations.
7. CONCLUSION
The paper proposes ReversiSpec, a comprehensive solu-
tion to mitigate speculative induced attacks. ReversiSpec
is a reversible approach that uses speculative buffers in all
cache levels to record the effects of speculative execution.
When a speculative load becomes safe, a merge operation is
performed to add the effects of speculative execution to the
global state. When a speculative load is squashed, a purge
operation is performed to clear the buffered speculative ex-
ecution states. The key problem solved by the paper is the
first demonstration of a reversible cache coherence protocol
that naturally rollbacks the effects of squashed speculative
execution without blocking the processor.
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